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Abstract  
We assess the predictive and discriminant validity of the basic values in the refined value 
theory (Schwartz et al., 2012) by examining how value tradeoffs predict behavior in Italy, 
Poland, Russia, and the USA. 1857 respondents reported their values and rated their own and 
a partner’s behavior. Multigroup CFA supported the distinctiveness of the 19 values and the 
19 self- and other-rated behaviors. MDS analyses supported the circular motivational order of 
the 19 values. Findings affirmed the theorizing that behavior depends upon tradeoffs between 
values that propel and inhibit it. Across four countries, value importance, behavior frequency, 
and gender failed to moderate the strength of value-behavior relations. This raises the 
question of the conditions under which the widely cited assumption that normative pressure 
weakens value-behavior relations holds. 
Keywords: refined value theory, values, behavior, value tradeoffs, moderation of value-
behavior relations 
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Value Tradeoffs Propel and Inhibit Behavior: Validating the 19 Refined Values in Four 
Countries 
How many basic human values is it worthwhile for researchers to distinguish?  By 
‘values’, we refer to “desirable transsituational goals, varying in importance, that serve as 
guiding principles in the life of a person or other social entity” (Schwartz 1994: p. 21).  The 
recently refined theory of basic values (Schwartz, et al., 2012) suggests that it is sometimes 
desirable to distinguish 19 motivationally distinct values.  Sixteen of these values are more 
narrowly defined than the ten values in the widely used original theory (Schwartz, 1992) and 
three remain the same.  The refined theory retains the key assumption that values form a 
circular motivational continuum.  It argues, however, that partitioning this continuum into a 
finer set of meaningful values can yield increased heuristic and predictive power.  Moreover, 
the refined theory identifies the expected patterns of association between these values and 
any external variable by specifying the order of the 19 values around the motivational circle.  
The 19 values are arrayed on the same two basic dimensions as in the original theory. 
In order to establish the benefit of adopting the refined theory, it is necessary first to 
establish that individuals across cultures actually do discriminate the 19 values.  Beyond that, 
it is necessary to demonstrate that each of these values relates in distinctive ways to other 
variables such as attitudes, behaviors and demographic variables.  Schwartz et al. (2012) 
assessed the discriminant validity of the refined values in a study in ten countries, using a 
newly developed values instrument.  They also examined the order of the values around the 
circle and their associations with numerous attitude, belief, and background variables.  They 
found substantial support for the discriminant validity of the refined theory, some for the 
predictive validity and, with some exceptions noted below, evidence for the circular order of 
the values.  Table 1 presents the 19 values of the refined theory. 
Critically, however, there is only minimal evidence that the 19 narrowly defined values 
predict behavior distinctively.  This is critical because a major reason for studying values is 
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the assumption that they can explain, influence, and predict behavior (Roccas & Sagiv, 2010; 
Rokeach, 1973).  A recent study related the 19 values to behavior in a Russian sample 
(Schwartz & Butenko, 2014).  In that study, both values and behavior were based only on 
self-reports, however.  Thus, shared method variance and recall of relevant past behavior 
when reporting own values may have accounted for or inflated the observed value-behavior 
correlations. 
The current research examines relations of values to behavior using both other-rated and 
self-rated behavior.  Moreover, we gathered data in four socio-economically and culturally 
diverse countries, Italy, Poland, Russia, and the USA.  We assess whether each of 19 values 
exhibits its expected pattern of associations with behaviors, whether these associations are 
present in each sample, and whether gender and normative pressure moderate them.  Earlier 
research has demonstrated associations of the ten values in the original theory with a wide 
variety of behaviors.  Examples include helping behavior (Lӧnnqvist et al., 2009 ), creative 
behavior (Kasof et al., 2007), interpersonal violence (Knafo, Daniel, & Khoury-Kassabri, 
2008), risky sexual behavior (Goodwin, et al. 2002), environmental behavior (Schultz & 
Zelezny, 1998), drug use (Tamayo et al., 1995), internet use (Hartman, et al., 2006), choice of 
medical specialty (Eliason & Schubot, 1995), consumer choices (Doran, 2009), musical 
preferences (Gardikiotis & Blatzis, 2012).  None of these nor other studies provide evidence 
for the predictive validity of the refined values, nor do they explicitly examine the effects on 
behavior of tradeoffs between opposing values. This is the aim of the current research. 
The Structure of Basic Values 
The value theory posits that basic values form a circular continuum that reflects the 
motivational conflict or compatibility among them (Schwartz, 1992).  Values are compatible 
if decisions and behaviors that express or promote the goals of one also express or promote 
the goals of the other.  Values conflict if decisions or behaviors that express or promote the 
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goals of one do so at the expense of the other.  The more compatible any two values, the 
closer they are on the circle, the more in conflict, the more distant.  Figure 1 displays the 
theorized value circle, modified to present the order that Schwartz et al. (2012) found with an 
earlier instrument.  We expect to replicate this order in our four new samples.  
Figure 1 identifies three bases for the order of values around the motivational circle.  
These bases help to explain why specific values promote or oppose particular behaviors.  The 
outermost circle distinguishes values that concern ways of coping with anxiety and protecting 
the self (bottom) from values that concern relatively anxiety-free ways in which people grow 
and expand the self (top).  The second circle distinguishes values concerned with personal 
outcomes (right) from values concerned with outcomes for others or for established 
institutions (left).  The inner circle combines the values into four higher order values that 
form two bipolar dimensions of motivationally incompatible values, self-transcendence vs. 
self-enhancement and conservation vs. openness to change.  As Figure 1 shows, it is possible 
to measure 19 values, to combine adjacent values to measure the original ten values (plus 
humility and face, added in the refined theory), or to measure the four higher order values, as 
appropriate to one’s research purposes. 
The current study goes beyond previous research in several important ways.  First, 
previous research on value-behavior relations examined relations of each value only to 
behaviors it was expected to promote (Bardi & Schwartz, 2003) and/or to inhibit (Schwartz & 
Butenko, 2014).  In doing so, it ignored a key postulate of the value theory inherent in the 
notion of the motivational circle: Any behavior is a product of tradeoffs between the values 
that promote and oppose it.  If a value on one side of the circle promotes a particular 
behavior, values on the opposing side of the circle should simultaneously inhibit that 
behavior.  We examine the tradeoff between opposing values in predicting each behavior. 
Value Tradeoffs and Behavior 6 
 
Second, as noted, Schwartz and Butenko (2014) used self-reports of values and behavior.  
This may increase value-behavior consistency because people may base self-reported values 
on their recall of past behaviors.  Moreover, self-reports suffer from several response biases 
(e.g., Mõttus, et al., 2012; Paulhus & Vazire, 2009).  We reduced such biases by using both 
self- and other-reports of behavior.  The advantages of each type of report may compensate, 
at least partly, for the disadvantages of the other.  The main advantage of self-reports is that 
individuals base them on the full range of their experiences; raters can base other-reports only 
on experiences they share with the target or on hearsay.  The main disadvantage of self-
reports is that such motivated biases as social desirability and consistency seeking distort 
them; other-reports are less vulnerable to these biases (John & Robins, 1993; Paulhus & 
Vazire, 2009).  Other-reports of values, like other-reports of personality, may explain unique 
variance in behavior (Vazire & Mehl, 2008; Wagerman & Funder, 2007).  We sought to 
utilize the unique information available in both self- and other-reports of behavior by 
combining them into composite scores rather than treating them as indicators of a latent 
variable, which would capture only the variance they share. 
Third, we examine characteristics of values and of behavior that may moderate the 
strength of value-behavior relations.  In a study in Israel, Bardi and Schwartz (2003) found 
that highly endorsed values and frequently performed behaviors exhibited weaker value-
behavior relations.  They suggested that such values and behaviors are normative and 
proposed that normative pressure induced individuals to comply with group expectations 
rather than to base their behavior on their own values.  This yielded weaker value-behavior 
correlations for normative than for non-normative values and behavior.  Tens of subsequent 
publications have cited this finding (e.g., Fischer et al., 2009; Hitlin & Piliavin, 2004; 
Lipponen, Bardi, & Haapamäki, 2008; Lönnqvist, Leikas, Paunonen, Nissinen, & Verkasalo, 
2008) without testing it.  However, it did not replicate in the one Russian study that did test it 
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with self-reported behavior (Schwartz & Butenko, 2014).  We test this widely cited 
normative explanation of variation in the strength of value-behavior relations for the first 
time across multiple countries using self- and other-reported behavior. 
Gender is another potential moderator of the strength of value-behavior relations.  The 
normative pressure explanation implies that relations should be stronger when gender role 
expectations are weak, say for power for women and benevolence for men (e.g., Best & 
Thomas, 2004; Eagley, Wood, & Johannesen-Schmidt, 2004; Schwartz & Rubel, 2005).  
Another mechanism yields the same prediction. It combines gender roles with the idea that 
value-behavior relations are stronger when the decision to behave is more deliberate and 
consciously controlled (Roccas et al., 2002).  Self-conscious deliberation is more likely 
before engaging in role-inappropriate behavior.  Hence, value-behavior relations should be 
stronger for power for women and benevolence for men.  Schwartz and Butenko (2014) 
found that relations of power values to behavior were indeed stronger for women than for 
men.  However, they found no gender differences for benevolence values and several 
unexpected gender differences.  We evaluate the validity and generalizability of the 
normative and gender role explanations by examining gender differences in the strength of 
value-behavior relations in four countries. 
Hypotheses 
To validate the refined theory, it is necessary to determine whether each of the 19 values 
in the theory relates as expected to behavior.  Although multiple values may motivate a single 
behavior, some types of behavior are likely to be motivated primarily by one value and 
inhibited by its conceptually opposed values.  For example, behaviors that manipulate or 
control others for one’s own benefit are likely to be motivated by power values and inhibited 
by self-transcendence values.  In order to assess value-behavior relations, we specified in 
advance a set of behaviors we expected to be linked most strongly with each of the 19 values.  
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We assess the predictive, convergent, and discriminant validity of the 19 values by 
investigating how each one relates to its corresponding behavior as well as to the behaviors 
corresponding with the other 18 values.  We also examine the tradeoffs between each value 
and its opposing values in predicting the corresponding behavior.  Each of the following 
hypotheses actually specifies 19 testable hypotheses, one for each value.   
1a. Values correlate significantly positively with their a priori corresponding behavior.  
1b. Values correlate more positively with their corresponding behavior than with any   
other behavior.  
2a. Behaviors correlate significantly positively with their corresponding value. 
2b. Behaviors correlate more positively with their corresponding value than with any 
other value. 
These hypotheses express the theoretical view that each of the 19 values has unique 
positive associations with behavior, so it is desirable to distinguish among them.  The 
following hypotheses address the claim that there is a tradeoff between values that propel and 
inhibit behaviors.  The set of higher order values from the opposing side of the value circle 
represents the inhibiting values.  We use a set of potentially inhibiting values rather than any 
single value because more than one value is motivationally opposed to each value, at least in 
part. 
3. The higher order values correlate negatively with the behaviors motivated by a value 
to which they are motivationally opposed.  
4. When jointly predicting a behavior by its corresponding value and opposing higher 
order values, both contribute significantly, the former positively and the latter negatively. 
Hypotheses 1, 2, 3, and 4 test the theoretical assumption that behavior entails a tradeoff 
between values that propel the behavior and those that oppose it (Schwartz, 2010).  
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Hypothesis 5 tests the implications for value-behavior relations of the theoretical assumption 
that values form a circular motivational continuum.  
5. The relative magnitude of the correlations of each value with the 19 behaviors and of 
each behavior with the 19 values approximates a sinusoid curve reflecting the order of the 
circular motivational continuum.  
We test these five hypotheses for all 19 values.  
The five hypotheses address the primary objective of this study, to assess the validity of 
the 19 values as unique predictors of behavior.  We also assessed the expectations that 
normative pressure and gender moderate the strength of value-behavior relations.  Before 
addressing the hypotheses, however, we addressed two critical, preliminary questions.  (1) 
Can we discriminate each of the 19 values in the data from each country?  (2) Are the 
discriminated values ordered around the value circle as theorized (i.e., as in Figure 1)?  
This study does not assess causality.  Nonetheless, there is reason to believe that value-
behavior associations attest to at least some causal influence of values on behavior.  Studies 
that prime values support such causal influence by showing that value manipulations 
influence subsequent behavior in value-consistent directions (e.g., Maio, 2015; Maio, 
Pakizeh, Cheung, & Rees, 2009; Sagiv, Sverdlik, & Schwarz, 2011; Verplanken & Holland, 
2002).  For example, priming achievement values improved task performance, priming 
benevolence values increased volunteering, and priming self-direction values promoted 
information seeking.  Values may lead to behavior through both motivational and cognitive 
processes.  As expressions of underlying motivations in the form of goals, values make 
behavior that promotes these goals more attractive and motivates such behavior (Feather, 
1995; Rokeach, 1973; Roccas & Sagiv, 2010).  As mental representations of desirable goals, 
values promote behaviors that are cognitively associated with and instantiate these goals 
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(Maio, 2015). In both instances, activation of a value may give rise to an affective response 
that energizes action (Schwartz, 2015).  
Method 
Participants 
The samples included 1,857 respondents from Italy, Poland, Russia
1
, and the USA. Table 
2 presents basic demographic information.  These were convenience samples that varied in 
size and in composition by population, age, gender, and education. Because of these and 
other differences among the samples, it is appropriate to view this research as four separate 
replications.  In all countries, participation was voluntary, participants received no 
compensation and were free to withdraw, and researchers guaranteed anonymity in reporting 
the data. Ethical clearance was obtained from institutional review boards (IRBs) in Italy and 
the USA.  IRBs were not consulted in Poland or Russia, where questionnaire research like 
this, that poses no risks to the adult, volunteer participants, requires no clearance.  
Procedure 
Pairs of respondents completed a questionnaire that measured basic values and everyday 
behaviors.  They first reported their own values, then rated the everyday behaviors of the 
person they chose as a partner, completed a distraction task, and then rated their own 
everyday behaviors.
2
  The two persons responded at the same time, without consultation.  
                                                          
     
1
The self-report data of the Russian sample were used by Schwartz and Butenko (2014). 
We include both self- and other-reports of behavior, test additional hypotheses, and analyze 
the data differently. 
     
2
We chose this set order of tasks rather than counterbalancing based on findings in an earlier study. 
Fifteen respondents reported their values prior to their behaviors, separated by a distraction task, and 
15 answered in the reverse order. Value-behavior correlations were substantially stronger when 
behaviors were measured first. This suggests that people are more likely to infer their values—largely 
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Sessions took approximately 40 minutes.  We presented the research as a study of 
interpersonal familiarity.  
In both Italy (Rome) and Poland (Warsaw area), trained university students recruited 
pairs of adult members of the general population among their acquaintances and friends of 
acquaintances.  Data were gathered in respondents’ homes.  The Polish students received 
course credit for their work.  In Russia (Moscow), trained graduate students recruited and 
administered the questionnaire to more than half the student respondent pairs in classrooms, 
one-third in dormitories, and the remainder online. In the USA (Florida), the researcher 
recruited pairs of students in classrooms where they completed the questionnaires or took 
them home and returned them to course instructors.  Some 10% of respondents from an 
online course, responded by email.  Respondents were requested to choose as a partner 
someone they knew quite well. 
Measures
3
 
Values. Respondents completed a revised version of the Portrait Values Questionnaire 
used by Schwartz et al. (2012).  This version, the PVQ-R, replaced the nine items identified 
as problematic in that study and reordered the wording of some other items.  Like the 
previous version, the PVQ-R includes 57 short, gender-matched, verbal portraits of different 
people, each describing a goal that is important to the person.  For each portrait, respondents 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
unarticulated latent constructs—from their concrete behaviors and seek consistency of self reports 
than they are to infer their behaviors—which they have observed directly—from their values. 
Consequently, placing values first introduces less of this unwanted source of variance in value-
behavior relations.   
3
 The anonymized raw data, related coding information, and all materials used to collect data 
in their original wording are available through the Social Science Data Center of the Hebrew 
University of Jerusalem. 
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indicate how similar the person is to themselves on a 6pt scale: 1 – not like me at all, 2 – not 
like me, 3 – a little like me, 4 – moderately like me, 5 – like me, 6 – very much like me.  
Respondents’ own values are inferred from the values of the people they describe as 
similar to themselves.  For example, a respondent who indicates that a person described by 
“Enjoying life’s pleasures is important to him” is similar to himself presumably attributes 
importance to hedonism values.  Additional examples are, “Obeying all the laws is important 
to her” (conformity-rules) and “It is important to him never to be humiliated” (face).  Online 
supplement A presents the full list of PVQ-R items.  For each language, iterations of 
translation and back-translation to the English original were carried out until agreement was 
reached that the translation optimally captured the nuances of each item.  
Behaviors. We adopted the 85-item Everyday Behavior Questionnaire (EBQ) developed 
by Schwartz and Butenko (2014).  It consists of sets of three to six behaviors that are 
expected to be motivated most strongly by one of the 19 values in the theory.  The items were 
originally chosen based on a pretest of 116 items with a sample of 25 Russian students who 
were familiar with the 19 values.  We asked these students to assign each behavior to the 
value to which it was most relevant.  We included in the EBQ only those behaviors that at 
least two-thirds of the pretest respondents assigned to the expected value and at least 80% 
assigned to that value or a value adjacent to it in the circle.  The number of items for each 
value reflects the diversity of contexts and of actions in which people commonly express that 
value.  More than 95% of Schwartz and Butenko’s (2014) Russian respondents had reported 
opportunities to perform each behavior during the past year.  The researchers in the countries 
of this study judged that opportunities to perform these behaviors were also common in their 
countries, a judgment subsequently confirmed by participants’ responses.  
The EBQ uses the act-frequency approach of Buss and Craik (1983), who argued that the 
best way to assess a tendency to behave in particular ways is to measure the frequency of 
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actions across time and situations.  The EBQ asks respondents how frequently they or their 
target person have performed each behavior in the past year.  Gosling et al. (1998) have 
shown that reports of the frequency of highly specific behaviors are often quite accurate.  
Respondents estimated how often they [the other] have engaged in each behavior during the 
past year relative to the number of times they [he or she] had an opportunity (emphasis in the 
original) to do so.  The response scale was numbered and labeled as follows:  0—never, 1—
rarely (about a quarter of the times), 2—sometimes (about half of the times), 3—usually 
(more than half the times), 4—always.  An additional response alternative, “never had even 
one opportunity to do something like this,” allowed respondents to distinguish never 
performing a behavior from never having an opportunity to do so.  We treated this response 
alternative, which constituted less than 1% of responses, as missing data.  
Online supplement B lists all of the behavior items in the EBQ.  Examples, with their 
corresponding value, are, “learned something simply for the joy of learning” (self-direction- 
thought), “kept promises I made to friends or family” (benevolence-dependability), and 
“celebrated national or ethnic group holidays” (tradition).  We employed the same 
translation-back-translation procedure used for values to translate the EBQ. 
Distractions. After reporting their own values and rating the 85 behaviors of their target 
person, respondents completed two distraction tasks before rating their own behaviors.  This 
was intended to reduce recall of self-reported values that might bias self-ratings of behavior 
toward consistency.  Respondents first completed a colorful, relatively easy maze. They were 
then asked to compose as many words as possible from the letters in the word for ‘medicine’ 
in their native language (e.g., медицина in Russian).  The distraction tasks took 5-10 minutes.  
Familiarity. Lastly, respondents reported how well they knew their target person on a 
5pt scale (1—not so well to 5—very well) and for how long.  Mean familiarity ratings were 
3.6 (SD = 1.03) in Russia, 4.4 (SD = .97) in Italy, 4.4 (SD = .72) in Poland, and 4.4 (SD = 
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.75) in the USA.  These ratings indicate that respondents knew one another quite well.  Mean 
length of acquaintance ranged from 2.45 years (SD = 2.81) in Russia to 14.63 (SD = 12.03) in 
Italy, and 82% of respondents had known their partners for over three years. 
Statistical Analyses 
Multi-group confirmatory factor analysis (MGCFA). We used (MGCFA) to assess 
distinctiveness and establish indices for the 19 values and the 19 sets of behavior.  We 
followed the recommendation in Cieciuch and Schwartz (2012) and ran separate models for 
each higher order value for the following reasons: (1) The number of respondents in all but 
the Polish sample was too small to assess models with 19 latent variables and 57 value items 
or 85 behavior items reliably (Harrington, 2008).  (2) The circularity of the values model 
means that value items might have negative cross-loadings on values on the opposite side of 
the motivational circle.  CFA models of the whole circle might therefore introduce negative 
cross-loadings that would contribute to misspecification and reduce model fit (Davidov, 
Schmidt, & Schwartz, 2008).  Negative cross-loadings on values on the opposite side of the 
circle are relevant for assessing the shape of the circular structure.  They are irrelevant, 
however, to our goal of obtaining cross-culturally comparable indicators for specific values 
and sets of behavior.  (3) This strategy is therefore the common practice for assessing the 
distinctiveness of single constructs in complex values models (e.g., Cieciuch & Schwartz, 
2012; Saris, Knoppen & Schwartz, 2013, Schwartz & Butenko, 2014). 
We assessed metric measurement invariance (equal loadings across groups) because that 
level of invariance is needed to compare correlations across countries, (Davidov, Meuleman, 
Cieciuch, Schmidt, 2014).  If full metric measurement invariance was not established, we 
tested for the partial invariance by releasing the most noninvariant loadings.  Partial 
invariance is sufficient for meaningful cross-country comparisons when the loadings of at 
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least two indicators per construct are equal across groups (Byrne, Shavelson, & Muthen, 
1989). 
To evaluate model fit at the configural level, we used the Comparative Fit Index (CFI), 
the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA), and the Standardized Root Mean 
Square Residual (SRMR).  We treated CFI values => .90, RMSEA values <= .08, and SRMR 
values <= .08 as indicating a reasonable model fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999; Marsh, Hau, & Wen, 
2004).  To evaluate metric measurement invariance, we applied criteria proposed by Chen 
(2007): Lack of invariance is indicated by a change larger than .01 in CFI, supplemented by a 
change larger than .015 in RMSEA or a change larger than .03 in SRMR, compared with the 
configural invariance model.  We performed all analyses with Mplus 7.1 (Muthén & Muthén, 
2012), using the maximum likelihood estimator.  
We view basic values as latent variables that influence responses to specific value items.  
We therefore derived factor scores for each value from MGCFA at the metric measurement 
invariance level.  Factor scores provide more reliable indices of values than the sum scores 
used in previous value-behavior research.  We also derived factor scores for each of the 19 
behaviors from the MGCFA at the metric level of measurement invariance of the set of a 
priori behavior items intended to tap it.  We did this separately for self-reported and other-
reported behavior and combined the two factor scores into a composite behavior score.  
 Multidimensional scaling (MDS). In order to assess the structure of relations among 
the 19 values and their order around the circular motivational continuum we used 
confirmatory, non-metric, multidimensional scaling (Borg, Groenen, & Mair, 2013).  MDS 
provided graphic representations of the spatial relations among the 19 values, allowing us to 
assess whether they were ordered as theorized around the circle.  The MDS spatial 
projections of the 19 values also disclosed whether it was possible to combine adjacent values 
to recapture the original ten values and the four higher order values.  We ran separate MDS 
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analyses in each country, using as input the factor scores for each value.  For these analyses, 
we used the SPSS 20 MDS Proxscal program, with ordinal proximity transformations, 
Euclidian distance measures, and Z-score transformations of values.  We also generated an 
overall structure by running an MDS analysis on the pooled within-sample covariance 
matrices of the four samples, equally weighting each sample.  All analyses used a custom 
initial configuration (Bilsky, et al., 2011) derived from the theorized circle in Figure 1.
4
  We 
compared the structure in each of the four samples to the overall structure by rotating it to the 
overall structure with orthogonal Generalized Procrustes Analysis (Commandeur, 1991).  
Regression. In order to formally test the hypothesis that the value expected to propel a 
behavior and the higher order value opposed to it jointly predict the behavior, the former 
positively and the latter negatively, we ran separate regressions for each behavior in each 
sample.  Specifically we regressed the centered factor score of each behavior on the 
corresponding centered value and the centered opposing higher order value.  We used the 
opposing higher order value rather than a specific value from the opposite side of the 
motivational circle for two reasons.  Values are not necessarily evenly spaced around the 
circle, so it is not certain which is the most opposed value.  Also, multiple values oppose each 
value in the circle motivationally and are likely to inhibit the behaviors it propels.  To 
estimate the overall effects on each behavior across the four diverse samples, we used 
hierarchical linear modeling (HLM 6, Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002).  This method takes the 
hierarchical structure of the data into account.  We centered the predictors on the group 
means in order to examine effects within each sample and to avoid confounding by mean 
                                                          
     
4
The design matrix for the initial configuration assigned starting coordinates for each of 
the 19 values at increasing angles of 19 degrees (i.e., 19 x 19 ~ 360).  Results were very 
similar using Torgerson initial configurations. 
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differences between samples on the predictors.  The HLM analyses also revealed whether the 
effects of values on behaviors varied significantly across samples.  
Results 
Preliminary Issues: Discrimination of the Values and Behaviors  
Before testing the hypotheses, it was necessary to assess whether the 19 values and 
behaviors could be discriminated and to develop indices for them.  The three panels of Table 
3 reports goodness of fit statistics for the MGCFA models of values, self-rated behaviors, and 
other-rated behaviors.  The first column lists the number of domains (factors) in each higher 
order domain and the number of items in the CFA model tested.  The table provides the 
statistics for the configural and metric invariance models, and, if the fit of the metric model 
was only borderline, the partial metric model.  The table also notes any items that were 
dropped, loadings that were released, and correlated errors within domain, based on the 
modification indices.  We constrained all models to have no cross-loadings across factors. All 
models met at least two of the three criteria for an adequate fit.  
The top panel of Table 3 presents findings for the basic values CFA models.  At least 
two of the three a priori items served as indicators of each latent value factor.  The middle 
panel presents findings for the self-rated behaviors models.  The factor scores for the latent 
self-rated behaviors were all based on at least three a priori items.  The bottom panel presents 
findings for the CFA models of other-rated behaviors.  The factor scores for the latent other-
rated behaviors were also all based on at least three a priori items.  
Correlations between self-rated and other-rated behaviors averaged .43 (SD = .076) 
across behaviors and countries, ranging from .29 for self-direction action behaviors to .61 for 
tradition behaviors.  These correlations are somewhat higher than those reported in studies of 
personality traits (e.g., McCrae & Costa, 1987; Mount, Barrick & Strauss, 1994) and of act 
frequencies (summarized in Gosling, John, Craik, & Robins, 1998) are.  Supplement C 
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reports the correlations for the 19 behavior indices in each country.  Based on these results, 
we averaged the self- and other-rated behavior factor scores to form the behavior indices.  We 
also ran separate analyses of value-behavior relations for the self- and other-ratings to insure 
that the pattern of findings was the same.  This was indeed the case.
5
  
Discrimination of both values and behaviors in 19 domains enabled us to test the 
hypotheses regarding unique value-behavior associations for each of the 19 values.  We used 
the factor scores from the MGCFAs to operationalize the values and behaviors in subsequent 
analyses. 
Preliminary Issues: The Circular Structure of Relations among the Values 
Hypotheses 3, 4, and 5 assume that the values are ordered around the circle as the theory 
specifies.  Figure 2 presents the MDS plot of the 19 values based on the pooled correlation 
matrix for the four countries.  It corresponds exactly to the theorized order in Figure 1.  The 
separate MDS plots for each sample revealed structures quite similar to the combined sample 
(see Supplement G).  Column 1 of Table 4 presents the Spearman correlation between the 
order of the values around the circle and the theorized order in each sample.  Reflecting only 
one or two reversals of adjacent values, all correlations were .99.  This made it feasible to test 
the hypotheses regarding sinusoidal associations between values and behaviors.  In every 
country, the six conservation values opposed the four openness to change values and the four 
self-enhancement values opposed the five self-transcendence values.  This made it feasible to 
use the higher order values to test the hypothesized tradeoffs between opposing values in 
predicting behavior.  
 Column 2 of Table 4 presents the Tucker’s phi coefficients obtained when applying 
Generalized Procrustes Analysis (Commandeur, 1991) to compare the structure in each 
sample to the overall structure.  The coordinates of the items in each sample correlated at 
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 Not unexpectedly, correlations were stronger in most instances for self-rated behavior. 
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least .90 with those in the overall structure on both the first and second dimensions.  This 
suggests a high level of similarity in the value structures (Van de Vijver & Poortinga, 1994).  
Predictive and Discriminant Validity of the 19 Values 
Table 5 presents the pooled correlation matrix of each value with each behavior, equally 
weighting each sample, using centered factor scores.  The correlations between each value 
and its corresponding behavior are on the diagonal.  All these correlations were significant 
(p<.001, 2-tailed).  According to H1a, each value should correlate most positively with its 
corresponding behavior.  This was the case for 13 of the 19 correlations: they exceeded the 
18 correlations with other behaviors (see next to last column).  The correlations for five other 
values exceeded 17 of the 18 other correlations, correlating more positively only with a 
behavior that corresponded with an adjacent value in the motivational circle.  Given that we 
expect adjacent values to correlate similarly with other variables, this was a minor deviation.  
Thus, H1a received substantial support for 18/19 values.  The correlation of the achievement 
value with its corresponding behavior exceeded its correlations with only 15 other behaviors.  
Supplement D provides the correlation matrix for each country.  These matrices also 
supported H1a. Seventy-four of the 76 (4 x 19) correlations, fully 97%, were significant.  
According to hypothesis 1b, each value should correlate significantly more positively 
with its corresponding behavior than with any other behavior.  The last column of Table 5 
lists the number of correlations that the corresponding value-behavior correlation exceeded 
significantly (p<.05, 2-tailed), comparing dependent correlations with Steiger’s Z (1980).  
This correlation exceeded all other correlations for 12 values and all but one other correlation 
for six values.  The one correlation not exceeded was with a behavior that corresponded with 
an adjacent value in the motivational circle.  Overall, the correlations of values with their 
corresponding behavior exceeded their correlations with other behaviors in 98% of 
comparisons.  Thus, H1b received substantial support for 18 of the 19 values.  The correlation 
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of the achievement value with its corresponding behavior significantly exceeded only 15 of 
the correlations with other behaviors.  In the matrices for the four countries, correlations with 
the corresponding behavior exceeded those with all other behaviors in 95% of 1368 (4 x 18 x 
19) comparisons. 
According to hypotheses 2a and 2b, each behavior should correlate most positively with 
its corresponding value, and this correlation should exceed its correlation with any other 
value.  Comparing each of the correlations on the diagonal of Table 5 with the correlations in 
its column addresses these hypotheses.  As indicated in the next to last row of the Table, 13 
of these 19 correlations were the highest in their column.  The correlations for five other 
behaviors exceeded 17 of the 18 other correlations, excepting only a correlation with a value 
adjacent in the circle to their corresponding value in four cases and two steps away in one 
case.  The last row in the Table indicates that, for 12 behaviors, the correlation with its 
corresponding value exceeded all other correlations significantly (p<.01, 2-tailed) and, for 
five behaviors, it exceeded all but one correlation with an adjacent value.  Thus, both H2a 
and H2b received substantial support for 18 of the 19 behaviors, all but face behaviors.  In the 
matrices for the four countries, correlations of behaviors with their corresponding value 
exceeded those with all other values in 96% of 1368 comparisons, 94% significantly. 
According to hypothesis 3, each of the 19 values should correlate negatively with the 
behaviors motivated by values to which that value is motivationally opposed—values distant 
in the motivational circle.  To test this hypothesis, we examined the correlation of each value 
with the behaviors presumably motivated by the opposing higher order values (e.g., the 
correlations of the power-dominance value with the behaviors presumably motivated by the 
self-transcendence values).  Table 5 reveals that 95% of the correlations of a value with the 
behaviors that an opposing higher order value presumably motivates were negative.  The 
exceptions were near-zero correlations, ranging from .01 to .03, of benevolence-caring and 
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benevolence-dependability behaviors with achievement and face values.  In the separate 
matrices of the four countries, 93% of the correlations with behaviors motivated by opposing 
values were negative.  These findings support H3.  
Value Tradeoffs 
Like previous research on value-behavior relations (Bardi & Schwartz, 2003; Schwartz 
& Butenko, 2014), however, the preceding analyses do not address the key idea inherent in 
the notion of the motivational circle of values: Behavior is a product of tradeoffs between 
values that propel it and values that oppose it.  This implies that the corresponding value and 
the opposing higher order value jointly predict behaviors, the former positively and the latter 
negatively (H4).  Regressions that included both the values expected to propel and to inhibit 
each behavior provided a direct test of value tradeoffs.  
Columns 1 to 8 in Table 6 present the resultant beta coefficients and zero-order 
correlations for each country.  All correlations of values with their corresponding behaviors 
were positive and significant (p<.05, 1-tailed).  All opposing higher order values correlated 
negatively with the behaviors, as expected, and 71/76 were significant.  All but one of the 
standardized beta coefficients for the corresponding values were in the expected positive 
direction and 69/76 were significant.
6
  For the opposing higher order values, 72/76 betas were 
negative, as expected, but only 41 were significant.  
The right side of Table 6 presents results of the HLM analyses, summarizing findings 
across the four samples.  All 19 values predicted their corresponding behavior significantly.  
Eighteen of the betas for the opposing higher order values were negative, as expected, and 
nine were significant.  For benevolence-caring behavior, the beta of the self-enhancement 
higher order value was .03.  The variance in behavior accounted for by the tradeoff between 
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 In the USA, the standardized beta for the self-direction action value was -.11, although 
its correlation was positive and significant (.12). 
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values that propel and those that oppose the behavior averaged 16.0%, ranging from 4.3% 
(personal security) to 29.4% (hedonism).  The last column of Table 6 indicates that 14 of the 
19 slopes of the propelling values and 9 of the 19 slopes of opposing higher order values 
varied significantly across samples.  
Assessing the Sinusoid Curves 
Hypothesis 5 tests the implications for value-behavior relations of the claim that values 
form a circular motivational continuum.  It posits that the correlations of each value with the 
19 behaviors and of each behavior with the 19 values approximate a sinusoid curve that 
follows the order of the circular continuum.  The strongest correlation in each row and 
column of the value-behavior correlation matrix should be on the diagonal and correlations 
should decrease as one moves away from the diagonal in each row and column.  The pattern 
of correlations starting from the diagonal would then resemble a U shape.  We tested H5 by 
correlating the value-behavior correlations in the columns and rows of the matrix in Table 5 
with the polynomial coefficients of a quadratic, U shaped, trend (Bardi & Schwartz, 2003; 
Strang, 2006).
7
  We did this for each value across the 19 behaviors and for each behavior 
across the 19 values.  The resulting correlations indicate how well the patterns of value-
behavior correlations approximate a sinusoid curve.  
 Column 1 of Table 7 lists the approximation correlations with a sinusoid curve for 
each value across all behaviors.  Column 2 lists the correlations for each behavior across all 
values. For values, the mean correlation was .83, for behaviors .80 (both p < .001, 2-tailed, 
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We used the following coefficients, starting from the correlation between each value and 
its own behavior: 10, 9, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9.  We specified only one 
highest coefficient because we expected only one peak and two smallest coefficients because, 
with an odd number of categories (19), each category has two maximally opposed categories.   
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with r to z transformation).  The approximation correlations supported the hypothesis for all 
19 values and 19 behaviors (both p < .05, 2-tailed, with r to z transformation).  In separate 
analyses for each sample (see Supplement E), mean correlations for countries ranged from 
.72 (Poland) to .84 (Italy) for values and from .65 (Russia) to .81 (Italy) for behaviors.  The 
mean correlations across countries were .76 for values and .72 for behaviors.  Thus, relations 
of many different values with many different behaviors reflect the same motivational 
conflicts and compatibilities captured by the circular continuum of values.  
Moderators of the Strength of the Value-behavior Association 
 Normative pressure. Bardi and Schwartz (2003) found that value-behavior 
associations are weaker for behaviors that group members frequently perform and for values 
that the group endorses highly.  We tested this claim in our four countries by correlating the 
order of the 19 value-behavior correlations in each country with the order of the mean 
importance of the 19 values and of the mean frequency of the 19 behaviors.  The assumption 
that normative pressure moderates value-behavior relations implies that the correlations 
should be negative.  Table 8 presents the Spearman correlations obtained in each country.  
The correlation with value importance was significantly negative in Italy, significantly 
positive in Russia, and not significant in Poland and the USA. The correlation with behavior 
frequency was significantly negative in Italy and not significant in the other countries.  
Gender. Schwartz and Butenko (2014) suggested that gender might moderate the 
strength of value-behavior relations.  They expected stronger value-behavior relations for 
power among women and for benevolence among men, as explained in the introduction.  We 
examined possible moderation by gender by regressing each of the 19 behaviors on its 
corresponding value, on gender, and on the multiplicative interaction between the value and 
gender.  We standardized gender and the value factor score before forming the interaction 
term.  Supplement F reports results of the regression analyses in each country.  Our analyses 
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did not replicate the finding of stronger relations for power among women in any of the four 
samples.  For benevolence–caring, we found stronger relations among men in Poland but 
among women in Italy.  For benevolence-dependability, we also found stronger relations 
among men in Poland.  For humility, relations were stronger among men in Italy but among 
women in Russia.  Gender moderated the strength of value-behavior relations (p<.05) in only 
seven of 76 (4 country x 19 values) analyses. 
Discussion 
This research sought to assess whether each of the 19 values in the refined theory 
predicts behavior distinctively.  It examined relations of values to behavior, measured by 
combined self-reports and other-reports, in four socioeconomically and culturally diverse 
countries.  Correlations between self-rated and other-rated behaviors were substantial, 
averaging .43.  Analyses of responses to the PVQ-R, using MGCFA and MDS, established 
that respondents in each country discriminated all 19 values and that the values were arrayed 
on the theorized circular motivational continuum.  This made it possible to test the 
hypothesized relations of values to behavior.  Separate analyses of value-behavior relations 
for the self-rated and other-rated behaviors showed a similar pattern.  Four types of analyses 
supported the predictive and discriminant validity of the 19 values. 
First, in the combined sample correlation matrix, all 19 correlations of a value with the 
behavior for which it was expected to be the primary motivator were positive and significant.  
Moreover, in the matrices of all four countries, all 19 values correlated positively with the 
behavior for which they were expected to be the primary motivator and 97% were significant.  
These findings support hypothesis 1a.  
Second, in the combined sample correlation matrix, correlations of values with their 
corresponding behavior exceeded correlations with other behaviors in 98% of comparisons.  
Moreover, for all but achievement values, no other value correlated significantly more 
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strongly with their corresponding behavior.  Across the matrices of the four countries, 
correlations of values with their corresponding behavior exceeded their correlations with 
other behaviors in 95% of comparisons.  These findings support hypothesis 1b. 
Third, in the combined sample correlation matrix, each behavior correlated more 
positively with its corresponding value than with any other value in 98% of comparisons.  
This was also the case in 96% of comparisons across the matrices of the four countries.  The 
correlation differences were significant in 97% of comparisons in the combined matrix and in 
94% across countries.  These findings support hypotheses 2a and 2b.  
Fourth, in the combined sample matrix, values correlated negatively with behaviors 
presumably motivated by an opposing higher order value in 95% of cases across countries.  
The only exceptions were two near zero correlations of achievement values and of face 
values with benevolence behaviors.  Across the matrices of the four countries, the 
hypothesized negative correlations of values emerged in 93% of comparisons.  These 
findings support hypothesis 3.  
Value tradeoffs 
This study provided the first systematic test of the key idea of the value theory inherent 
in the notion of the motivational circle: Behavior is a product of tradeoffs between values that 
propel it and values that oppose it.  Regressions of each behavior on its corresponding value 
and opposing higher order value addressed this idea.  In 75 of the 76 regressions, values 
predicted their corresponding behavior, 71 significantly.  For the opposing higher order 
values, 72 of the betas were negative, but only 41 were significant.  The regressions provide 
some support for the tradeoff hypothesis (H4).  In the HLM summary analysis across 
countries, all corresponding values predicted significantly and all but one of the betas for 
opposing values were negative, but only nine were significant.  Thus, the values expected to 
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propel behavior related more strongly and consistently to behavior than did the values 
expected to inhibit it.  
Might this stronger association of propelling versus inhibiting values be a general 
characteristic of value-behavior relations?  In the current study, inhibiting values did not have 
an equal chance.  First, each of the 19 sets of behavior was chosen with the expectation that a 
particular value would motivate it positively, without regard for the values that might inhibit 
it.  Second, we operationalized the expected inhibiting values as the higher order value 
opposed to the propelling value in the motivational circle.  It is likely that some component 
values of each higher order value were less relevant to the behavior than others were, thereby 
weakening the observed associations.  In order to assess the relative importance of propelling 
and inhibiting values in value tradeoffs, it is necessary to find behaviors that are specifically 
and equally relevant to both values. 
The slopes of the behaviors on the values that propelled and opposed them varied across 
the four countries in 23 of the 38 cases.  Variation across countries was no greater for the 
values that propelled behavior compared with those that opposed behaviors nor for values 
from any one of the four higher order values (all p>.15 by χ2 test).  However, the most 
frequent sources of significant variation were the slopes in the USA (10 cases) and Russia (9 
cases). In almost every case, the effect in these two countries was the weakest.  The fact that 
respondents in the USA and Russia knew each other for considerably fewer years than 
respondents in Poland and Italy (mean 6.5 and 2.5 versus 10.6 and 14.6, respectively, F (3, 
1958) = 84.85, p <.001) may explain this.  In the USA and Russia, other ratings were 
substantially poorer predictors of behavior than self ratings, whereas the two ratings differed 
much less in Poland and Italy.  
Overlapping Content: An Alternative Explanation for Value-behavior Relations 
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Might the content of the behaviors themselves explain the structure of their relations to 
values?  This does not seem likely (cf. Schwartz & Butenko, 2014).  There need be no 
inherent conflict between behaviors that express opposing values.  For example, “avoid 
walking alone on a dark street at night” (security-personal) need not conflict with “change 
plans spontaneously” (stimulation).  These behaviors are opposed because security values 
motivate one and stimulation values motivate the other.  Furthermore, there need be no 
inherent similarity between behaviors that express compatible values.  “Insist that others do 
what I want” (power-dominance) and “buy luxury brands of clothing so that other people will 
notice” (power-resources) are not inherently similar behaviors.  What makes them compatible 
is that both express a motivation for power and control, whether over people or resources.  In 
sum, the motivational conflicts and compatibilities that structure relations among values 
largely guide their relations with behaviors. 
Moderators of Value-behavior Relations 
Normative pressure. Bardi and Schwartz (2003) found that value-behavior associations 
are weaker for behaviors that group members frequently perform and for values that the 
group endorses highly.  They suggested that such behaviors and values are normative, so 
individuals comply with normative expectations rather than behaving according to their own 
values.  The normative pressure explanation for variation in the strength of value-behavior 
relations is often cited and widely accepted (e.g., Fischer et al., 2009; Hitlin & Piliavin, 2004; 
Lipponen, Bardi, & Haapamäki, 2008; Lönnqvist, Leikas, Paunonen, Nissinen, & Verkasalo, 
2008).  It did not replicate in the Schwartz and Butenko (2014) Russian study with self-
reported behavior, however.   
The strength of value-behavior relations correlated negatively with value importance in 
Italy but positively in Russia in the current study, and the correlations were not significant in 
Poland and the USA.  The strength of value-behavior relations also exhibited inconsistent 
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correlations with behavior frequencies, negative in Italy but not significant in the other in 
three countries.  In sum, studies in two countries, Israel and Italy, have supported the 
normative pressure explanation whereas studies in three countries have not.  This challenges 
researchers to identify conditions under which normative pressure does or does not 
undermine value-behavior relations.  The opposing findings for Italy and Russia in the same 
study makes it unlikely that differences in study design produced the inconsistency.  
An alternative approach could draw on the idea of cultural differences in the extent to 
which internal attributes predict behavior (Church, 2008). A possible explanation might draw 
on the tightness-looseness of the national culture. Tighter cultures have stronger social norms 
and less tolerance for deviance (Gelfand, et al., 2011; Uz, 2015).   In tighter cultures, we 
might expect individuals to be more sensitive to and compliant with normative pressures 
rather than acting on their own values.  Scores for tightness are available for the five 
countries mentioned here in Gelfand et al. (2011; except Russia) and Uz (2015; except 
Israel). Contrary to expectations, one of the countries in which the normative pressure 
explanation was supported (Israel) scored lowest on tightness and the other (Italy) scored 
lowest on tightness in Uz (2015) but highest in Gelfand et al. (2011).  Thus, the challenge 
remains to identify the dimension(s) that distinguish Israel and Italy from Poland, Russia, and 
the USA that might account for the different observed effects of normative pressure on value-
behavior relations. 
Gender. Schwartz and Butenko (2014) suggested that gender might moderate the 
strength of value-behavior relations.  They expected stronger value-behavior relations for 
power among women and for benevolence among men.  They had no expectations for gender 
differences for other value domains.  Their findings confirmed the moderating role of gender 
for power values but not for benevolence values.  They also obtained several unexpected, 
significant interactions.  Our analyses did not replicate the finding of stronger relations for 
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power among women in any of the four samples.  For benevolence-dependability and –
caring, we found stronger relations among men than among women only in Poland.  Gender 
moderated the strength of value-behavior relations (p<.05) in only seven of 76 (4 country x 
19 values) analyses.  This could easily be a chance result.  Hence, systematic gender 
differences in the strength of value-behavior relations seem unlikely. 
Order of the values in the motivational circle 
As in the MDS projections in the 15 Schwartz, et al. (2012) samples, the two 
benevolence values were adjacent to the openness to change higher order values and the three 
universalism values were adjacent to the higher order conservation values in our four 
samples.  They used centered raw scores for 48 value items in the MDS analyses, whereas we 
used factor scores for 19 values.  Our findings, based on somewhat different measures, 
reinforce the conclusion that this is the appropriate order of the values in the refined theory, 
rather than the order that Schwartz, et al. (2012) initially hypothesized.  This study also 
provided a new type of evidence for the circular motivational continuum of the value theory.  
The patterns of correlation between each value and all 19 behaviors and between each 
behavior and the 19 values, assessed by the sinusoid curves, largely reproduced the circular 
order of the theory.  Thus, not only did relations among values reveal the motivational circle, 
relations of values to behavior did so too.  
The MDS projections also confirm that the PVQ-R can be used to form indices of the 
original ten values or the four higher order values.
8
  The refined theory discriminated facets 
of conformity, security, power, self-direction, universalism, and benevolence values. In the 
MDS analyses, the facets of each of these original values were adjacent (e.g., power-
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 We recommend using the improved and revised PVQ-RR, which is available from the 
first author, to measure the values. 
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dominance adjacent to power-resources).  Moreover, the values that constitute each higher 
order value formed a unique region.  
Future Directions 
Causal relations between values and behavior 
The current study supported the validity of the values through their links with behavior.  
It did not test the implicit assumption that at least some of that association is causal, linking 
values to behavior through both motivational and cognitive processes.  As expressions of 
underlying motivations in the form of goals, values make behavior that promotes these goals 
more attractive and motivate such behavior (Feather, 1995; Rokeach, 1973; Roccas & Sagiv, 
2010).  As mental representations of desirable abstract goals, values promote behaviors that 
are cognitively associated with and instantiate these goals (Maio, 2015). Longitudinal studies 
are needed to assess the causal role of the 19 values in predicting behavior.  Experimental 
studies that manipulate the salience of the values and examine the impact on behavior and on 
value-behavior relations are also desirable.  Past longitudinal and experimental studies of this 
sort with the original ten values can serve as models (e.g., Maio et al., 2009; Schwartz, 
Caprara, & Vecchione, 2010).  Such studies are usually limited to investigating only one or 
two values at a time, but a systematic series of studies could assess all 19 values. 
Values and the study of morality 
Like other theories of values, morality, and culture (e.g., Graham et al., 2012; Schweder 
et al., 1997), ours seeks to identify basic principles that are recognized as desirable by 
individuals across cultures and that may guide cognition, emotion, and behavior.  Basic 
values, like moral foundations, typically function as automatic intuitions whose influence 
occurs outside of awareness; reasoning about the value bases of judgments and actions comes 
later and often serves to justify them (Schwartz, 2006).  Basic values are more fine-tuned 
than the foundations of morality.   
Value Tradeoffs and Behavior 31 
 
If lists of the foundations of morality are reasonably complete, each of the 19 basic 
values should represent a virtue relevant to at least one foundation.  The currently dominant 
theory specifies five foundations (Graham, et al., 2012).  Most values clearly constitute 
virtues relevant to one or another foundation.  For example, we can link benevolence-caring 
to Care, universalism-tolerance to Fairness, and tradition to Loyalty, Authority, and Sanctity.  
Might basic values, as narrower expressions of the moral foundations mediate their relations 
to attitudes and behavior?  Few studies have examined moral foundations and basic values 
together (e.g., Haidt, Graham, & Joseph, 2009). None has addressed this plausible hypothesis.  
Matching the values to the five foundations suggests many questions both about the 
values and the moral foundations.  We mention six that might stimulate further thinking.  
Self-direction values are among the most important values across cultures (Schwartz & Bardi, 
2001).  Yet, none of the five moral foundations clearly underlies them.  The wide-spread 
importance of these values supports accepting the proposed Liberty as a sixth foundation.  
We also find no match for achievement values. This supports the proposed Industry 
foundation that it would match. Conformity-rules represents the group-oriented moral 
foundations of Loyalty, Authority, and Sanctity, associated with conservative ideologies.  In 
contrast, conformity-interpersonal represents the individual-oriented moral foundations of 
Care and Fairness, associated with liberal ideologies.  Yet, the two types of conformity values 
are closely related in value analyses.  Might this suggest that that the two types of conformity 
values are more distinct than the value theory recognizes or that the distinction between the 
two broad sets of moral foundations is over-stated?  Benevolence-caring is a virtue relevant 
to the foundation of Care and benevolence-dependability a virtue more linked to the 
foundation of Loyalty.  Are the two types of benevolence more distinct than the value theory 
assumes or are the two foundations less distinct?  Relations among the moral foundations 
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have received little consideration.  Are they orthogonal or, like values, might they form some 
sort of continuum?  
Choice and measurement of behaviors 
Our goal of validating the values by relating them to behavior led to a priori selection of 
behaviors that we expected to express each value.  Researchers might focus, instead, on 
behaviors chosen because they are of particular interest in themselves.  It would be 
interesting to examine the extent to which the 19 values explain these ‘neutral’ behaviors that 
are likely to express multiple values.  Such studies could profitably include a scale to measure 
basic traits (e.g. the Big Five).  This would permit assessing the relative contributions to 
explaining such behaviors of values, traits, and their interactions (cf. Caprara et al. 2006).  
Studies of varied behaviors could clarify the types of behavior that values versus traits 
explain more effectively.  Past research provides limited data indicating that values predict 
deliberate behavior better and traits predict affective, automatic responses better (e.g., Roccas 
et al. 2002).  Further research could evaluate this view and try to identify other characteristics 
of behavior that influence the relative predictive power of values and traits. 
It is important to go beyond reports of behavior to investigate how the 19 values relate to 
actual, objectively measured behavior (Baumeister, Vohs, & Funder, 2007).  This is difficult 
to do in any single study for 19 different types of behavior, of course.  One method that may 
provide behavioral data relevant to several values and that comes closer to actual behavior is 
experience sampling in real time over several weeks.  
Conclusions 
The refined value theory (Schwartz et al. 2012) proposed that partitioning the circular 
motivational continuum into a finer set of meaningful values could yield increased heuristic 
and predictive power.  Past research (Schwartz et al. 2012) supported the discriminant and 
predictive validity of the more narrowly defined values of the theory by examining their 
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associations with attitude, belief, and background variables.  A Russian study, using self-
reports, found some evidence for relations of the values to behavior (Schwartz & Butenko 
(2014).  The current study, which measured behavior with combined self- and other-reports 
in four countries, provided a convincing validation of the values by relating them to behavior.  
Although we measured reported rather than actual behavior, combining other-reports 
with self-reports improved the behavior indices.  Self-reports draw on targets’ knowledge of 
their own behavior that is unavailable to others; other-reports are less vulnerable to self-
consistency and defensive biases.  Self-other agreement was high enough to suggest that 
targets and others reported on some of the same actual behavior, but low enough to suggest 
that each report added important information.  The fact that self-other agreement on values is 
as high as self-other agreement on personality traits and on act frequencies is interesting in 
itself. 
In keeping with the theory, values related negatively to the behaviors they were expected 
to inhibit, not only positively to the behaviors they were expected to promote.  This accords 
with the basic assumption of the theory that values influence both what people do and what 
they do not do.  The regression analyses in this study were the first to reveal the effects of 
value tradeoffs.  The HLM results, summarizing all four samples, provided the first available 
estimates of the variance in behavior that value tradeoffs explain.  Across the 19 domains, the 
value expected to propel a behavior and the higher order value expected to oppose it 
explained an average of over 16% of the variance.  Considering the large number of 
influences on any behavior, this strengthens the view that values make a meaningful 
contribution to understanding behavior. Moreover, the current evidence for value tradeoffs 
suggests that future studies of the relations of behavior to values, in contrast to the vast 
majority of past research, should include not only the values expected to propel a behavior 
but also those expected to oppose it. 
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Table 1  
The 19 values in the refined theory, each defined in terms of its motivational goal  
Value Conceptual definitions in terms of motivational goals 
Self-Direction—Thought (SDT) Freedom to cultivate one’s own ideas and abilities 
Self-Direction—Action (SDA) Freedom to determine one’s own actions 
Stimulation (ST) Excitement, novelty, and change 
Hedonism (HE) Pleasure and sensuous gratification 
Achievement (AC) Success according to social standards 
Power—Dominance (POD)  Power through exercising control over people  
Power—Resources (POR) Power through control of material and social resources 
Face (FAC) Maintaining one’s public image and avoiding humiliation 
Security—Personal (SEP) Safety in one’s immediate environment 
Security—Societal (SES) Safety and stability in the wider society 
Tradition (TR) Maintaining and preserving cultural, family or religious 
traditions 
Conformity—Rules (COR) Compliance with rules, laws, and formal obligations 
Conformity—Interpersonal (COI) Avoidance of upsetting or harming other people 
Humility (HUM) Recognizing one’s insignificance in the larger scheme of 
things 
Universalism—Nature (UNN) Preservation of the natural environment 
Universalism—Concern (UNC) Commitment to equality, justice and protection for all 
people 
Universalism—Tolerance (UNT) Acceptance and understanding of those who are different 
from oneself 
Benevolence—Caring (BEC) Devotion to the welfare of in-group members 
Benevolence—Dependability 
(BED) 
Being a reliable and trustworthy member of the in-group 
From Schwartz et al. (2012).  
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Table 2 
Description of the Samples in the Study 
Country Sample 
Type 
N % 
Female 
Language Age M     
(sd)  
Education 
Years M 
(sd) 
Mode 
Italy Adults 300 56 Italian 32.9 (13.8) 14.4 (3.1) written 
Poland Adults  1218 50 Polish 32.3 (11.2) 15.5 (2.6)         written 
Russia Students 266 68 Russian 20.7 (4.0) 13.7 (2.0) 95% written 
 5% online 
United States Students 232 59 English 24.2 (7.6) 14.8 (2.0) 90% written 
10% email 
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Table 3 
Global fit measures for the continuous multi-group confirmatory factor analyses across 4 countries: Tests of invariance  
VALUES 
# factors 
(items) 
χ2 df RMSEA SRMR CFI Items Dropped 
Self-transcendence 
     Configural 
5(15)  
719.4 
 
268 
 
.058 [.053-.063] 
 
.042 
 
.953 
 
     Metric  809.0 295 .059 [.054-.064] .057 .947 bed2 
Self-enhancement 
     Configural 
4(12)  
897.01 
 
188 
 
.086 [.081-.092] 
 
.063 
 
.906 
 
     Metric  1008.7 212 .086 [.081-.092] .078 .895  
     Partial metric*  982.8 209 .086 [.080-.091] .073 .900 
 
Conservation 
     Configural 
6(18)  
1460.0 
 
480 
 
.064 [.060-.067] 
 
.053 
 
.915 
 
     Metric  1545.6 516 .063 [.059-.067] .059 .911  
Openness    
     Configural 
4(12)  
445.0 
 
116 
 
.075 [.068-.082] 
 
.048 
 
.927 
 
     Metric  540.3 134 .078 [.071-.084] .069 .910 he3 sda3 
     Partial metric**  508.9 128 .077 [.070-084] .065 .916  
*Added correlated error between por1-por2 and released loading of ac1. **Released loadings of sd1 and st1. 
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BEHAVIOR SELF-
RATED 
# factors 
(items) 
χ2 df RMSEA SRMR CFI 
Items Dropped 
Self-transcendence 
     Configural 
5(21)  
1403.5 
 
500 
 
.060 [.056-.064] 
 
.054 
 
.915 
 
unt3 bec2 bed3 
     Metric  1535.7 539 .061 [.057-.064] .062 .906 
Self-enhancement 
     Configural 
4(16)  
566.0 
 
192 
 
.062 [.056-.068] 
 
.050 
 
.917 
 
ac1 ac2 fac2  
     Metric  632.4 216 .062 [.056-.067] .058 .907 
fac3 
Conservation 
     Configural 
6(28)  
1273.9 
 
612 
 
.046 [.043-.050] 
 
.048 
 
.900 sep3 sep4 sep6  
ses1 cor1 coi1 
co14 hum2 hum3 
 
     Metric*  1373.5 654 .047 [.043-.050] .053 .892 
 
Openness 
     Configural 
4(19)  
710.7 
 
284 
 
.055 [.050-.060] 
 
.053 
 
.904 
 
sda1 sda3 st4 
he4 he5 
     Metric  814.3 314 .056 [.051-061] .059 .887 
 
     Partial metric**  766.4 305 .055 [.050-.060] .056 .896 
 
*Added correlated errors between tr2-tr3 and between coi1-coi3. **Released loadings of st1, he1, sda4.  
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BEHAVIOR OTHER-
RATED 
# factors 
(items) 
χ2 df RMSEA SRMR CFI 
Items Dropped 
Self-transcendence 
     Configural 
5(21)  
1568.4 
 
568 
 
.059 [.056-.063] 
 
.058 
 
.906 
 
bec1 bed3 
     Metric  1667.5 610 .059 [.055-.062] .063 .900 
Self-enhancement 
     Configural 
4(16)  
543.4 
 
192 
 
.060 [.054-.066] 
 
.052 
 
.904 
 
ac1 ac2 fac2  
     Metric  592.1 216 .059 [.053-.064] .058 .898 
fac4 
Conservation 
     Configural 
6(28)  
1529.9 
 
860 
 
.039 [.036-.042] 
 
.045 
 
.907 sep3 ses3 cor3   
cor3 coi1 hum2  
 
     Metric  1637.3 911 .040 [.037-.043] .049 .900 
Openness 
     Configural 
4(19)  
494.4 
 
228 
 
.048 [.042-.054] 
 
.045 
 
.922 
 
sdt1 sda2 sda3 
st3 he4 he5      Metric  593.5 255 .051 [.046-.057] .053 .900 
     Partial metric*  520.7 240 .048 [.043-.054] .047 .917 
 
*Added correlated errors between st1-st2 and between he2-he3 and released loadings of sdt2, sdt3, sda4, st4, he1. 
Note. CFI= comparative fit index, RMSEA= Root mean square error of approximation, SRMR= standardized root mean square residual. If loadings 
were released in a partial metric model, at least two loadings remained constrained for each factor.  
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Table 4  
Comparisons of value structures in samples from four countries with the overall value 
structure  
Country  Spearman correlation 
between country order and 
overall order of 19 values 
Tucker’s phi  
dimension 1/  
dimension 2 
Poland .99 .92/.97 
Italy .99 .95/.90 
USA .99 .98/.94 
Russia .99 .92/.96 
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Table 5  
Correlations between the centered factor scores of the values and behaviors, averaging the matrices of the four country samples, with number of correlations in 
the row and column that the diagonal correlation exceeds and exceeds significantly (p<.05,2-tailed) 
 Behaviors # exceeded 
Values SDT SDA ST HE AC POD POR FAC SEP SES TR COR COI HUM UNN UNC UNT BEC BED > sig> 
SDT .35 .34 .31 .27 .21 .08 .04 .03 -.08 -.16 -.23 -.09 -.15 -.01 -.03 .06 .18 .22 .21 18 18 
SDA .30 .36 .31 .28 .19 .12 .09 .05 -.09 -.14 -.19 -.10 -.12 .00 -.05 .01 .12 .20 .19 18 18 
ST .25 .35 .47 .42 .20 .16 .16 .10 -.15 -.15 -.21 -.20 -.10 -.06 .02 .06 .12 .17 .13 18 18 
HE .23 .38 .46 .43 .21 .17 .17 .11 -.09 -.17 -.24 -.12 -.09 .00 -.06 -.02 .06 .22 .18 17 17 
AC .04 .21 .21 .23 .34 .36 .39 .37 .01 -.04 -.10 -.05 -.09 -.16 -.14 -.15 -.20 .03 .03 15 15 
POD .02 .23 .23 .25 .19 .42 .41 .26 -.13 .08 -.06 -.18 -.05 -.05 -.06 -.02 -.19 -.16 -.21 18 17 
POR .01 .21 .23 .26 .24 .44 .48 .32 -.07 .06 -.06 -.14 -.08 -.12 -.01 -.08 -.24 -.13 -.16 18 18 
FAC -.01 .09 .05 .07 .18 .18 .19 .31 .07 -.01 -.07 .05 -.03 -.03 -.16 -.17 -.17 .02 .01 18 18 
SEP -.21 -.29 -.37 -.31 -.19 -.13 -.12 -.09 .20 .17 .22 .19 .09 .03 -.03 -.08 -.15 -.19 -.16 18 17 
SES -.14 -.21 -.28 -.28 -.16 -.10 -.10 -.09 .11 .32 .27 .08 -.02 -.03 -.06 -.08 -.15 -.13 -.11 18 18 
TR -.30 -.28 -.29 -.29 -.15 -.10 -.06 -.07 .08 .22 .41 .08 .03 -.04 -.07 -.13 -.19 -.16 -.12 18 18 
COR -.23 -.38 -.46 -.41 -.20 -.22 -.21 -.15 .19 .16 .24 .25 .07 .06 -.03 -.06 -.09 -.19 -.12 18 18 
COI -.20 -.28 -.29 -.25 -.23 -.23 -.20 -.14 .05 .05 .07 .10 .28 .17 .04 .01 .00 -.16 -.15 18 18 
HUM -.18 -.23 -.27 -.23 -.23 -.25 -.22 -.18 .03 .08 .11 .09 .21 .18 .07 .03 .01 -.14 -.15 17 17 
UNN .06 -.20 -.14 -.17 -.24 -.24 -.27 -.27 -.05 -.02 -.02 -.02 -.01 -.04 .39 .33 .21 -.12 -.12 18 18 
UNC .04 -.14 -.12 -.14 -.24 -.32 -.36 -.29 -.07 -.11 -.04 .00 .03 .10 .12 .24 .32 .10 .09 17 17 
UNT .07 .05 .06 .05 -.15 -.17 -.17 -.20 -.10 -.14 -.11 -.07 .09 .15 .11 .19 .28 .04 .00 18 18 
BEC .03 .01 .01 .00 -.02 -.20 -.22 -.12 .05 -.15 -.05 .06 .02 .05 -.19 -.09 .10 .34 .37 17 17 
BED .01 .05 .04 .03 .02 -.14 -.15 -.05 .06 -.13 -.06 .07 .01 .07 -.21 -.13 .06 .31 .34 18 18 
# > 18 17 18 18 18 17 18 16 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 17 17 18 17   
# sig> 18 15 18 18 18 17 18 16 18 18 18 18 18 17 18 17 17 18 17   
Note: Correlation between each value and its corresponding behavior are bolded and on the diagonal.  
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Table 6  
Multiple regressions of behaviors on corresponding value and opposing higher order value and zero-order value-behavior correlations in four 
countries, based on centered factor scores from the MG-CFA. Combined samples analysis based on HLM. 
Value-Behavior Domain  
     Opposing Higher Order  
Country          Combined 
Poland  
N=1218 
Italy 
N=300 
USA 
N=232 
Russia  
N=266 
Samples 
N=2016 Do slopes 
 r  r  r  r            R
2 vary? 
Self-Direction-Thought SDT 
     Conservation 
.35** 
-.10** 
.42** 
-.34** 
.24* 
-.15* 
.31** 
-.26* 
.21** 
-.26** 
.36** 
-.38** 
.20** 
-.20** 
.33** 
-.33** 
.25**  .152  
-.18** 
no 
no 
Self-Direction-Action SDA 
     Conservation 
.19** 
-.39** 
.44** 
-.51** 
.38** 
-.30** 
.52** 
-.47** 
-.11 
-.41** 
.12* 
-.35** 
.22** 
-.21* 
.36** 
-.36** 
.16*    .195         
-.29** 
yes 
yes 
Stimulation ST 
     Conservation 
.26** 
-.37** 
.49** 
-.53** 
.39** 
-.37** 
.60** 
-.60** 
.06 
-.40** 
.30** 
-.44** 
.36** 
-.14* 
.50** 
-.38** 
.29**  .288        
-.34** 
yes 
yes 
Hedonism HE 
     Conservation 
.21** 
-.34** 
.45** 
-.49** 
.34** 
-.30** 
.53** 
-.52** 
.08 
-.32** 
.26** 
-.36** 
.38** 
-.22** 
.49** 
-.42** 
.28**  .294 
-.37** 
yes 
yes 
Achievement AC .40** .44** .40** .44** .23** .19** .23** .30** .17**  .130 yes 
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     Self-Transcendence -.06 -.30** -.06 -.31** .06 -.05 -.13* -.25** -.04 yes 
Power-Dominance POD 
     Self-Transcendence 
.43** 
-.24** 
.54** 
-.44** 
.42** 
-.17** 
.50** 
-.36** 
.32** 
-.21** 
.37** 
-.28** 
.21** 
-.18** 
.27** 
-.25** 
.23**  .213 
-.34** 
yes 
no 
Power-Resources POR 
     Self-Transcendence 
.52** 
-.15** 
.62** 
-.48** 
.50** 
-.08 
.55** 
-.38** 
.38** 
-.15* 
.46** 
-.36** 
.24** 
-.12* 
.30** 
-.25** 
.34**  .255 
-.16** 
yes 
no 
Face FAC 
     Self-Transcendence 
.19** 
-.30** 
.29** 
-.36** 
.24** 
-.34** 
.33** 
-.41** 
.20** 
-.13* 
.26** 
-.23** 
.31** 
-.10 
.35** 
-.24** 
.15**  .136 
-.22** 
no 
yes 
Security-Personal SEP 
     Openness to change 
.04 
-.06 
.08** 
-.09** 
.37** 
-.04 
.39** 
-.20** 
.20** 
-.02 
.20** 
-.09* 
.08 
-.10 
.14* 
-.14* 
.15**  .043 
-.02 
yes 
no 
Security-Societal SES 
     Openness to change 
.32** 
-.07* 
.35** 
-.22** 
.38** 
-.03 
.39** 
-.21** 
.19** 
-.07 
.20** 
-.10* 
.32** 
-.06 
.35** 
-.19** 
.28**  .098 
-.07* 
yes 
no 
Tradition TR 
     Openness to change 
.48** 
-.07* 
.52** 
-.35** 
.36** 
-.20** 
.45** 
-.35** 
.36** 
-.02 
.41** 
-.14* 
.28** 
-.01 
.28** 
-.17** 
.23**  .166 
-.05 
yes 
yes 
Conformity-Rules COR 
     Openness to change 
.20** 
-.00 
.20** 
-.13** 
.41** 
-.02 
.42** 
-.22** 
.24** 
-.06 
.26** 
-.16* 
.11 
-.05 
.13* 
-.11* 
.23**  .115 
-.02 
yes 
no 
Conformity-Interpersonal COI 
     Openness to change 
.29** 
-.03 
.27** 
-.13** 
.27** 
-.12* 
.32** 
-.22** 
.33** 
.02 
.32** 
-.14* 
.25** 
.06 
.22** 
-.04 
.28**  .142 
-.02 
no 
yes 
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Humility HU 
     ST, HE, AC, POD 
.17** 
.06* 
.13** 
-.03** 
.24** 
-.08 
.29** 
-.23** 
.08 
-.03 
.09* 
-.07 
.18** 
-.01 
 .19* 
-.09* 
.18**  .112 
-.01 
no 
no 
Universalism-Nature UNN 
     Self-Enhancement 
.22** 
-.09** 
.36** 
-.15** 
.51** 
-.12* 
.55** 
-.13** 
.36** 
.16* 
.32** 
-.06 
.29** 
-.02 
.32** 
-.13** 
.23**  .147 
-.02 
yes 
yes 
Universalism-Concern UNC 
     Self-Enhancement 
.14** 
-.03 
.14** 
-.08** 
.33** 
-.12* 
.41** 
-.21** 
.18** 
-.06 
.25** 
-.10* 
.15* 
-.01 
.15* 
-.10* 
.19**  .113 
-.03 
yes 
no 
Universalism-Tolerance UNT 
     Self-Enhancement 
.20** 
-.20** 
.25** 
-.25** 
.26** 
-.23** 
.35** 
-.33** 
.20** 
-.20** 
.24** 
-.24** 
.25** 
-.14* 
.28** 
-.21** 
.23**  .155 
-.13** 
no 
no 
Benevolence-Caring BEC 
     Self-Enhancement 
.37** 
-.01 
.42** 
-.08** 
.37** 
.02 
.34** 
-.07 
.37** 
-.03 
.38** 
-.23** 
.23** 
.04 
.23** 
-.01 
.29**  .144 
.03 
yes 
no 
Benevolence-Dependability BED 
     Self-Enhancement 
.45** 
-.02 
.43** 
-.10** 
.32** 
-.01 
.32** 
-.12* 
.30** 
-.18** 
.32** 
-.24** 
.28** 
-.01 
.28** 
-.09* 
.32**  .137 
-.03 
yes 
yes 
** p < .01, * p < .05, 1-tailed 
Notes. Value and behavior scores are based on centered factor scores from confirmatory factor analyses. The higher order value scores opposed to 
each value are based on the mean of the factor scores of the values opposed in the motivational value circle. The values that constitute each higher 
order value are: Self-Enhancement—AC, POR, POD, FAC ; Self-Transcendence—UNN, UNC, UNT, BEC, BED; Openness to change—SDT, 
SDA, ST, HE; Conservation—SES, SEP, TR, COR, COI. The set of values opposed to Humility is partly from the openness to change values and 
partly from the self-enhancement values.   
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Table 7  
Correlations approximating a sinusoid curve of the patterns of value-behavior correlations 
(based on the correlation matrix for the centered factor scores in Table 5) 
        Correlation approximating sinusoid curve for 
Value-Behavior Domain 
values with 19 
 behavior sets 
behavior sets  
with 19 values 
Self-Direction—Thought .976*** .861*** 
Self-Direction—Action   .921*** .895*** 
Stimulation  .935*** .931*** 
Hedonism  .837*** .908*** 
Achievement .906*** .908*** 
Power—Dominance  .779*** .908*** 
Power—Resources  .802*** .821*** 
Face  .715*** .632*** 
Security—Personal  .619*** .485* 
Security—Societal  .770*** .918*** 
Tradition  .857*** .896*** 
Conformity—Rules  .928*** .769*** 
Conformity—Interpersonal .962*** 821*** 
Humility  .914*** .704*** 
Universalism—Nature  .815*** .584** 
Universalism—Concern  .955*** .649*** 
Universalism—Tolerance  .884*** .880*** 
Benevolence—Caring  .622*** .696*** 
Benevolence—Dependability  .528* .742*** 
***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, all 1-tailed  
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Table 8 
Spearman rank correlations of the strength of value-behavior relations with value 
importance and behavior frequency 
Correlations of the strength 
of value-behavior relations 
with: Poland Italy USA Russia Mean 
Value importance .018 -.568** -.251 .475* -.082 
Behavior frequency ratings   -.164 -.544** -.174 .068 -.204 
**p<.01, *p<.05, 1-tailed 
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Figure 1. Circular motivational continuum of 19 values with sources that underlie their order. 
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Figure 2. Multidimensional scaling analysis of 19 values based on the pooled within-sample 
covariance matrix for four countries. N=1,857, Stress 1 = .1, dispersion accounted for = .99, Tucker’s 
coefficient of congruence = .99. 
Note. fs = factor score, SDT = self-direction-thought, the remaining value labels going counter-
clockwise around the circle from SDT follow the order in Table 1 and Figure 1.  
